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The timing of environmental policies with excess burden of taxation 
in free-entry mixed markets 
Abstract 
This study investigates the timing of environmental policies in free-entry mixed markets with excess 
burden of taxation. We consider two scenarios in which the government chooses the optimal tax before 
or after firms enter the market, and compare these ex-ante and ex-post taxations. When the excess 
burden of taxation is small (large), we find that ex-post taxation imposes a lower (higher) tax level than 
ex-ante taxation, which induces a larger (smaller) number of firms and a higher (lower) environmental 
damage. Finally, the effect of excess burden of taxation can increase the welfare, but ex-ante taxation 
always yields higher welfare than ex-post taxation. 
Keywords: Environmental policy; Ex-ante taxation; Ex-post taxation; Free entry; Mixed oligopoly 
JEL classification: L13, L32, H25, Q58 
1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s, the waves of market liberalization and environmental protection have been salient 
features of economic policies in polluting industries around the world. On the one hand, government 
has continuously conducted market-based environmental regulation by using taxes, subsidies and cap-
and-trades. For example, various studies have explored the effect of pollution taxation in imperfect 
competition markets and concerned about the optimal tax rate. The traditional tax rule suggests that the 
optimal rate is equal to the marginal environmental damage in perfect competition markets while it falls 
short of the marginal damage in imperfect competition markets.1 
On the other hand, technological and managerial improvement in public domains have motivated 
the entry of private firms having profit-maximizing incentives into the markets where public firms 
already exist and government regulates their activities. In the literature, many works have pointed out 
welfare implications of public policies in free entry markets are in sharp contrast with those in entry-
regulated markets.2 However, relatively few economic analyses on mixed markets where public firm 
competes with newly entering private firms have concerned on how an environmental policy interacts 
with a competition policy. The welfare effect of environmental policies in free entry mixed markets has 
                                            
1 See, for example, Buchanan (1969) and Barnett (1980) for monopoly and Levin (1985) and Shaffer (1995) for 
oligopoly. 
2 For example, Matsumura and Okumura (2014) compared specific taxation and volume quotas in a free entry 
oligopoly while Wang (2016) examined import tariff and output subsidy rates under open economy. 
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become an important concern of policy decision-making in the polluting industries such as oil, steel, 
electricity and so on. 
Since Mankiw and Whinston (1986) indicated the welfare loss of business-stealing effect in free-
entry markets, which causes not only less production but excessive entry under imperfect competition, 
many research in different fields have supported the robustness of these inefficiencies. In the literature 
of environmental economics, for example, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) and Lee (1999) 
examined the welfare effect of environmental policies in free-entry private industries. They found that 
the optimal tax should be set at the marginal environmental damage because the tax effect on the output 
is fully offset by the effect on the number of entering firms and thus the inefficiency of less production 
is invariant while the optimal tax can work for reducing excessive entry.3  
In the literature of mixed markets, Matsumura and Kanda (2005), Brandao and Castro (2007) and 
Ino and Matsumura (2010) examined the possible benefits of public ownership in free-entry mixed 
industries. They found that the existence of a welfare-maximizing public firm can induce the expansion 
of its output and less number of entering firms, which will fully offset the output substitution effect but 
the inefficiency of less production is invariant while the public firm can reduce excessive entry.4  
However, the government’s public policy causes the shadow cost of the public funds, which carries 
an excess burden of taxation.5 In the context of mixed oligopolies, for example, Capuano and De Feo 
(2010) examined the effect of the shadow cost of public funds on privatization in a mixed duopoly. 
Wang and Chen (2011) and Matsumura and Tomaru (2013) showed that the excess burden of taxation 
sharply affects the comparisons of optimal subsidy, total output, and social welfare in mixed oligopolies. 
Matsumura and Tomaru (2015) also examined the relationship between the equilibrium level and the 
efficient level of product differentiation with the shadow cost of the public funds. 
This paper investigates the environmental policies in free-entry mixed markets and examines the 
effect of excess burden of taxation, which comes from the tax revenue and the profit of the public firm. 
In particular, we examine the impact of the timing of environmental taxation and compare two models: 
                                            
3 In the subsequent research, it is proved that the optimal emission tax rate in free-entry markets depends on the 
curvature of market demand (Requate, 2007), the degree of product differentiation (Fujiwara, 2009), the output 
elasticity of emissions (Sugeta, 2017) and consumers awareness (Hsu et al., 2017). However, all these analysis 
still support that the optimal tax can reduce excessive entry. 
4 In the subsequent research, Cato (2008) considered environmental externalities and showed that the optimal 
degree of privatization is invariant in free-entry mixed polluting markets. However, Cato and Matsumura (2012, 
2015) showed that the optimal ownership of the public firm decreases as foreign penetration increases or the 
import tariff rate increases. 
5 The profits of public firms can be used for public finance while, as pointed out by Laffont and Tirole (1986), 
Lin et al. (1998) and Lin and Tan (1999), the government’s public policy through the public firm might cause the 
welfare loss. Further, the emission tax revenue can provide double-dividend effect, which can be also used for 
public finance. Also, as pointed out by Bovenberg and Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) and Fullerton 
(1997), an environmental tax has its own distorting effects on labor supply, which can have the same excess 
burden as a tax on labor income. 
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ex-ante taxation and ex-post taxation. In the former, the government decides environmental tax and then 
liberalizes the market, whereas the order of the policies is reversed in the latter. The ex-ante case might 
correspond to the situation that the government is able to make a commitment on the optimal tax rate 
before it opens the market to the newly entering private firms. It also represents the economic policy-
neutral case where the industrial and environmental policies do not incur any political cost. However, 
this neutral case is not always realistic. There might be strategic relationship between economic decision 
and political decision because of lobbying activities of firms and industrial associations for tax policies 
or the government’s budget constraint and fiscal concerns. Further, a change in economic environment 
such as technological improvement or ownership structure in the industry under open economy can 
affect the ex-post optimal decisions on the environmental policies. Thus, the ex-post case corresponds 
to this situation in which the adjustment of tax rate is easy and flexible.  
The main findings are summarized as follows. First, as the shadow cost increases, public firm 
becomes more aggressive and thus produces more outputs, which results in that the equilibrium number 
of private firms always decreases under both ex-ante and ex-post taxation cases. Second, under ex-ante 
taxation the optimal tax should be lower than the marginal damage and the efficient departure between 
them increases as the shadow cost increases. However, under ex-post taxation the efficient departure 
depends on the entry cost and the shadow cost, and the optimal tax might exceed the marginal damage 
when both entry cost and the shadow cost are large. Third, ex-post taxation yields a lower (higher) 
environmental tax level than the ex-ante taxation when the shadow cost is small (large). It induces that 
ex-post taxation yields a larger (smaller) number of private firms and a higher (lower) environmental 
damage. Finally, the effect of excess burden of taxation can increase the welfare, but the ex-ante taxation 
always yields higher welfare than ex-post taxation. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 
analyzes the ex-ante and ex-post taxation models and presents a comparative analysis of the two cases. 
Section 4 concludes the study. 
2. Model 
We consider a mixed market with Cournot oligopoly in which 1n +  operating firms produce 
homogeneous products. Firm 0 is a public firm and firm i (i=1,2,…, n) is a private firm. The inverse 
demand function is 1P Q= − , where Q = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=0  is the market output and 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 is firm j’s output, 
j=0,1,…, n , respectively. Then, consumer surplus can be measured as 2 / 2CS Q= .  
All firms have the same cost function, C�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗� = (𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗)2 2 + 𝐹𝐹2⁄ , where 𝐹𝐹2 is the entry cost of each 
private firm. In the analysis, following Matsumura and Kanda (2005), we assume that the public firm 
is already established in the initial market before the private firms enter the market and thus the fixed 
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cost of public firm is a sunk cost to the government when it decides its policy decisions. 
We assume that production leads to the emission of pollution 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗  and the emission level is 
proportional to the production level, that is, 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗 = 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗. The environmental damage due to emission is 
given by 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = ∑ (𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗)2 2⁄𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=0 . The government imposes an emission tax on the emission level with the 
tax rate of t . The resulting total tax revenue is 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡 ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=0 . The profits of each private firm is  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖�2 2⁄ − 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 − 𝐹𝐹2   for i=1,…, n ,     (1) 
We consider a free-entry mixed market in which private firms can enter the market where the 
public firm already exists. Then, the number of private firms is determined at the point where the profit 
of the private firm is zero. We allow the profit of public firm to be either negative or positive in the 
mixed market. The government revenue, which includes not only the government revenue from 
emission tax but the profit of public firm, can be used to reduce tax rates in other markets, which results 
in the reduction of dead weight loss due to distortionary taxation. That is, we consider the excess burden 
of taxation, i.e., 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 = 𝜆𝜆(𝜋𝜋0 + 𝑇𝑇).  
The welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, tax revenue, and ETB 
minus industrial pollution: 
𝑊𝑊 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜋𝜋0 + ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇 + 𝜆𝜆(𝜋𝜋0 + 𝑇𝑇) − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ,      (2) 
where 𝜆𝜆 ≥ 0 represents the shadow cost of the government revenue, which can be used to reduce the 
EBT as a public finance.  
Finally, the firms’ objective functions are subject to their ownership structures. We suppose that 
the private firm, which is completely characterized by private property rights, maximizes its profits, 
while the public firm, which is fully owned by the government, maximizes the social welfare.  
3. Analysis and comparison 
3.1. Ex-ante taxation  
We consider ex-ante taxation model in which the government chooses the level of environmental 
tax before private firms enter the market. The timing of this game is as follows. In the first stage, the 
government chooses the level of tax to maximize social welfare. In the second stage, with exogenously 
given tax rate each private firm decides whether to enter the market where the number of private firms 
is endogenously determined by a free-entry market condition, i.e., zero-profit condition. In the third 
stage, the public and private firms compete in quantities in a Cournot fashion. The subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium is solved by backward induction. 
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In the third stage, the public firm chooses 0q  to maximize the social welfare, W, and the private 
firm chooses iq  to maximize its own profits, iπ  simultaneously. Assuming interior solutions, the 
first-order conditions provide the following equilibrium outputs:6 
𝑞𝑞𝑜𝑜 = 2(1+𝜆𝜆)+𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡(2+𝜆𝜆)−1)
6+𝑛𝑛+2(3+𝑛𝑛)𝜆𝜆 ,         (3) 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = (2−3𝑡𝑡)(1+𝜆𝜆)
6+𝑛𝑛+2(3+𝑛𝑛)𝜆𝜆.          (4) 
The profits of the public and private firms are respectively 
𝜋𝜋0 = (2(1+𝜆𝜆)+𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡(2+𝜆𝜆)−1))(6(2𝑡𝑡−1)(1+𝜆𝜆)+𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡(2+𝜆𝜆)−1))
2(6+𝑛𝑛+2(3+𝑛𝑛)𝜆𝜆)2 ,                                  (5) 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 3(2−3𝑡𝑡)2(1+𝜆𝜆)2
2(6+𝑛𝑛+2(3+𝑛𝑛)𝜆𝜆)2 − 𝐹𝐹2.                                                     (6) 
The welfare is given by 
𝑊𝑊 = (1+𝜆𝜆)�12(1+𝜆𝜆)2+𝑛𝑛(1+𝜆𝜆)�8−9𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡+4(𝑡𝑡−1)𝜆𝜆)�−𝑛𝑛2�1+3𝑡𝑡2�2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆)�−2𝑡𝑡�3+𝜆𝜆(5+4𝜆𝜆)���
2(6+𝑛𝑛+2(3+𝑛𝑛)𝜆𝜆)2 − 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹2.     (7) 
In the second stage, each private firm earns zero profit in the equilibrium. Setting the profit of the 
private firms in equation (6) to zero yields the following equilibrium number of private firms: 
𝑛𝑛 = (1+𝜆𝜆)(√6(2−3𝑡𝑡)−12𝐹𝐹)
2𝐹𝐹(1+2𝜆𝜆) .                                                        (8) 
Note that the number of private firms decreases as the tax increases, i.e.,  𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
< 0, or as the shadow cost 
increases, i.e.,  𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
< 0 . This fact implies that the effect of tax on the number of firms can be 
complementary to the effect of the shadow cost under the ex-ante taxation, in which both effects can 
reduce the number of entering firms. 
The welfare is given by 
𝑊𝑊 = (1+𝜆𝜆){24𝐹𝐹2𝜆𝜆(2+𝜆𝜆)+4√6𝐹𝐹�1−𝜆𝜆−3𝑡𝑡�1+𝜆𝜆+𝜆𝜆2��+3�2𝑡𝑡�3+𝜆𝜆(5+4𝜆𝜆)�−1+3𝑡𝑡2�2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆)��}
6(1+2𝜆𝜆)2 .           (9) 
In the first stage, the government chooses the optimal tax level from the differentiation of W in 
equation (9) with respect to t: 
𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 = 3+𝜆𝜆(5+4𝜆𝜆)−2√6𝐹𝐹(1+𝜆𝜆+𝜆𝜆2)6+3𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆) ,                                                  (10) 
where subscript “B” denotes the equilibrium outcome of this game (taxation before entry). Note that 
                                            
6 In this study, all of the second-order conditions are satisfied. 
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𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 > 0 in the region of 0 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 = √612, which ensure a positive equilibrium number of private firm 
under ex-ante taxation. The tax decreases as the shadow cost increases, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
< 0 when 0 < 𝐹𝐹 <
𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵, and thus a higher effect of EBT brings about a lower tax rate. 
By substituting equation (10) into equation (8), we obtain the following equilibrium number of 
private firms: 
𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵 = (√6−12𝐹𝐹)(1+𝜆𝜆)22𝐹𝐹(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆)) .                                                         (11) 
The number of private firms decreases as the shadow cost increases, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
< 0 when 0 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵. 
It implies that under ex-ante taxation a higher shadow cost induces not only lower optimal tax rate but 
lower equilibrium number of private firms in a free-entry mixed market. Notice that the shadow cost 
directly reduce the number of private firms while it also indirectly increases the number of firms through 
taxation effect. However, this indirect effect is outweighed by the direct effect and thus, the number of 
private firms decreases as the shadow cost increases.  
The outputs of public and private firms are: 
𝑞𝑞𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵 = 12𝐹𝐹(1+𝜆𝜆)(2+𝜆𝜆)+√6𝜆𝜆(1+2𝜆𝜆)3√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))  and 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 = √63 𝐹𝐹                                   (12) 
where 𝑞𝑞𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵 > 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵. The output of public firm increases as the shadow cost increases, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆 > 0, 
while the output of private firm is independent of the shadow cost, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖
𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
= 0, which is determined 
by the zero-profit condition.7  
The public firm’s profit is: 
𝜋𝜋𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵 = −𝜆𝜆2(1+2𝜆𝜆)2+4√6𝐹𝐹(𝜆𝜆+2𝜆𝜆2)2+24𝐹𝐹2(1+𝜆𝜆)(2+𝜆𝜆)(2+5𝜆𝜆(1+𝜆𝜆))18(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))2                            (13) 
The public firm’s profit decreases as the shadow cost increases, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋
𝑜𝑜
𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
< 0.Thus, as the EBT is 
more significant, the public firm is more aggressive to produce more outputs while the total outputs of 
private firms decreases because the number of private firms decreases.  
Total market output become:  
                                            
7 Proof: Direct calculations from the zero-profit condition yields that the equilibrium price is equal to the average 
cost (AC) of each private firm. Also, the profit-maximization condition yields that the marginal revenue is equal 
to the marginal cost (MC) of each private firm. Thus, we have AC = MC + q at free-entry equilibrium, which 
yields 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 = √63 𝐹𝐹 in (12). 
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𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵 = √6(3+𝜆𝜆(7+5𝜆𝜆))−12𝐹𝐹(1+𝜆𝜆)(1+2𝜆𝜆)3√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆)) ,                                              (14) 
where 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0. Under ex-ante taxation, the increasing output effect of the public firm outweighs the 
decreasing total outputs effect of the private firms. 
Total and marginal environmental damages are  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵 = {√6�3+𝜆𝜆(7+5𝜆𝜆)�−12𝐹𝐹(1+𝜆𝜆)(1+2𝜆𝜆)}2108(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))2  and 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵 = √6(3+𝜆𝜆(7+5𝜆𝜆))−12𝐹𝐹(1+𝜆𝜆)(1+2𝜆𝜆)3√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))        (15) 
Note that these environmental damage are increasing in the shadow cost, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
>0 when 0 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵. Note also that 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 = 3−2√6𝐹𝐹6  if 𝜆𝜆 = 0. This indicates that under ex-ante 
taxation, Pigouvian tax rate is optimal in the absence of the EBT.8 However, as the shadow cost 
increases, the tax decreases while the marginal damage increases, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
< 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0. It 
implies that the efficient departure between the optimal tax and marginal damage increases as the 
shadow cost increases. In particular, we have the following efficient tax gap:  
𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵 = �−1+2√6𝐹𝐹�𝜆𝜆(2+𝜆𝜆)6+3𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆) ≤ 0 when 𝜆𝜆 ≥ 0. 
Then, EBT is  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 = 𝜆𝜆(3+6𝜆𝜆+4𝜆𝜆2−4√6𝐹𝐹(1+𝜆𝜆)2+24𝐹𝐹2(1+𝜆𝜆)2)6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))              (16) 
Note that 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 is positive and increasing in the shadow cost, i.e., 
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0 when 0 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵. 
Finally, the welfare is  
𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 = (1+𝜆𝜆){3−4√6𝐹𝐹(1+𝜆𝜆)2+24𝐹𝐹2(1+𝜆𝜆)2+2𝜆𝜆(3+2𝜆𝜆)}6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆)) .           (17) 
Then, the shadow cost affects both EBT and welfare positively, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0 when 0 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵. 
3.2. Ex-post taxation 
We consider ex-post taxation in which the government chooses the level of taxation after the entry 
of private firms. In other words, each private firm decides whether to enter the market in the first stage 
                                            
8 Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) and Lee (1999) examined the welfare effect of environmental tax policy in 
free-entry private industries and found that the optimal tax should be set at the marginal environmental damage. 
See footnote 3 for further discussion. 
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before the government decides the level of taxation.9  
In the third stage, both public and private firms simultaneously choose their output levels. The 
equilibrium outputs of the firms are derived in (3) and (4). In the second stage, the government chooses 
the optimal level of taxation. The differentiation of W in (7) with respect to t yields the following result: 
𝑡𝑡 = 18𝜆𝜆(1+𝜆𝜆)+𝑛𝑛(3+𝜆𝜆(5+4𝜆𝜆))
3(3+2𝑛𝑛+(15+4𝑛𝑛)𝜆𝜆+3(4+𝑛𝑛)𝜆𝜆2).                                                 (18) 
Note that the tax increases as the number of private firms increases, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛
> 0, or as the shadow cost 
increases, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0. Contrary to the ex-ante taxation, the effect of the shadow cost on tax can be 
changed under the ex-post taxation. 
By substituting equation (18) into equation (6), we obtain the following equilibrium profits of 
private firms: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 3(1+𝜆𝜆)42(3+2𝑛𝑛+(15+4𝑛𝑛)𝜆𝜆+3(4+𝑛𝑛)𝜆𝜆2)2 − 𝐹𝐹2.                                           (19) 
In the first stage, each private firm enters the market until it earns zero profit. Setting equation (19) 
to zero yields the following number of private firms in the equilibrium: 
𝑛𝑛𝐴𝐴 = (1+𝜆𝜆)(√6(1+𝜆𝜆)−6𝐹𝐹(1+4𝜆𝜆))2𝐹𝐹(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆)) ,                                                  (20) 
where subscript “A” denotes the equilibrium outcome of this game (taxation after entry). The number 
of private firms decreases as the shadow cost increases, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
< 0 in the region of 0 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 =
√6(1+𝜆𝜆)
6(1+4𝜆𝜆), which ensures a positive equilibrium number of private firm under ex-post taxation. Therefore, 
as EBT is more significant, the excessive number of entering private firms under both ex-ante and ex-
post taxation cases will be reduced.  
By substituting equation (20) into equation (18), we obtain the following optimal tax: 
𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 3+𝜆𝜆(5+4𝜆𝜆)−√6𝐹𝐹(3+2(1−𝜆𝜆)𝜆𝜆)6+3𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆) .                                             (21) 
Note that 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 > 0 in the region of 0 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴. But, as the shadow cost increases, the optimal tax rate 
takes U-shape in which it decreases first and then increases, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
≤ 0  when 0 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 =
2+(2−𝜆𝜆)𝜆𝜆
2√6(4+𝜆𝜆(13+7𝜆𝜆)) and 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆 > 0 when 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴. This is because the shadow cost directly increases 
                                            
9 Note that this case provides the same results as the case of the simultaneous choice between taxation and free 
entry because the equilibrium number of entering firms is given when the government decides the optimal 
environmental tax. 
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tax while it also indirectly decreases tax through decreasing the number of firms. Thus, these two 
separating effects work for deciding the optimal tax rate. 
The outputs of public and private firms are: 
𝑞𝑞𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴 = √6𝜆𝜆(1+2𝜆𝜆)+6𝐹𝐹(2+𝜆𝜆)(1+4𝜆𝜆)3√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))  and 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 = �23𝐹𝐹                                  (22) 
where 𝑞𝑞𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴 > 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴. The output of public firm increases as the shadow cost increases, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆 > 0, 
while the output of private firm is still independent of the shadow cost, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
= 0.  
The public firm’s profit is: 
𝜋𝜋𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴 = −𝜆𝜆2(1+2𝜆𝜆)2+2√6𝐹𝐹𝜆𝜆(2+3𝜆𝜆+4𝜆𝜆3)+6𝐹𝐹2(2+𝜆𝜆)(1+4𝜆𝜆)(6+𝜆𝜆(7+8𝜆𝜆))18(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))2 .          (23) 
The public firm’s profit decreases as the shadow cost increases either (i) when 𝜆𝜆 ≥ 1
2
 or (ii) when 𝜆𝜆 <
1
2
 and 𝐹𝐹 < 𝜆𝜆(1+2𝜆𝜆)
√6(2+𝜆𝜆(−1+2𝜆𝜆)). Otherwise, the public firm’s profit increases as the shadow cost increases. 
In either case, as the EBT is more significant, the public firm becomes more aggressive and produces 
more outputs. However, the total equilibrium output of private firms depends on the fixed cost and the 
shadow cost because the optimal tax also depends on the shadow cost. 
Total market output become:  
𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴 = √6(3+𝜆𝜆(7+5𝜆𝜆))−6𝐹𝐹(1+6𝜆𝜆+8𝜆𝜆2)3√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆)) .                                           (24) 
Under ex-post taxation the market output decreases first and then increases as the shadow cost increases, 
i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
≥ 0 when 0 < 𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 and 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆 < 0 when 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴.  
Total and marginal environmental damages are 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 = {√6�3+𝜆𝜆(7+5𝜆𝜆)�−6𝐹𝐹�1+6𝜆𝜆+8𝜆𝜆2�}2108(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))2  and 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 = √6(3+𝜆𝜆(7+5𝜆𝜆))−6𝐹𝐹(1+6𝜆𝜆+8𝜆𝜆2)3√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆)) .       (25) 
Note that these environmental damage depend on 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀. In specific, 
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
≥ 0 but 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
≤ 0 when 0 <
𝐹𝐹 ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 while the reverse is true otherwise. Note also that 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 = 3−√6𝐹𝐹6 > 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = 3−3√6𝐹𝐹6  if 𝜆𝜆 = 0. It 
indicates that under ex-post taxation, Pigouvian tax rate is not optimal even in the absence of the EBT. 
It is well-known result under the situations that the number of firms is given and each firm behaves 
under imperfect competition.10 Thus, the optimal tax is always less than marginal damage in the 
                                            
10 The optimal tax rate depends on the relative size of the externality and market power distortions under the 
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absence of EBT, but the efficient departure between optimal tax and marginal damage depends on the 
shadow cost. In particular, we have: 
𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 −𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 = −√6𝜆𝜆(2+𝜆𝜆)+12𝐹𝐹(𝜆𝜆(2+5𝜆𝜆)−1)3√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆)) . 
Then, we have 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 < 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 either (i) when 𝜆𝜆 ≤ 12 or (ii) when 𝜆𝜆 > 12 and 0 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝜆𝜆(2+𝜆𝜆)2√6(−1+2𝜆𝜆+5𝜆𝜆2). 
However, we have 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 > 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 when 𝜆𝜆 > 12 and 𝜆𝜆(2+𝜆𝜆)2√6(−1+2𝜆𝜆+5𝜆𝜆2) < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴. It is noteworthy that the 
optimal tax exceeds the marginal damage under ex-post taxation when the effect of EBT is more 
significant and the entry cost is high. 
Then, EBT is  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = 𝜆𝜆(3+6𝜆𝜆+4𝜆𝜆2−4√6𝐹𝐹(1+𝜆𝜆)2+18𝐹𝐹2(1+4𝜆𝜆))6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))              (26) 
Note that 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 is positive and increasing in the shadow cost, i.e., 
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0 when 0 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴. 
Finally, the welfare is  
𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 = (1+𝜆𝜆){√6�3+6𝜆𝜆+4𝜆𝜆2�+18√6𝐹𝐹2(1+4𝜆𝜆)−24𝐹𝐹(1+𝜆𝜆)2}6√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆)) .         ( 2 7 ) 
Then, the shadow cost affects both ETB and welfare positively, i.e., 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0 when 0 < 𝐹𝐹 < 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴. 
3.3. Comparisons 
We now compare the ex-ante and ex-post taxation cases. 
Lemma: 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 − 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 = √6(2𝜆𝜆−1)12(1+4𝜆𝜆) <>0 when 𝜆𝜆 <> 12.  
Let F∗ ≡ min{FB, FA}.  Then, we have the following proposition in the range of 0 < 𝐹𝐹 < F∗. 
Proposition: When the shadow cost is small (large), the ex-post taxation yields a lower (higher) 
emission tax, a larger (smaller) number of private firms and a higher (lower) environmental damage. 
However, the ex-ante taxation yields always higher social welfare than the ex-post taxation. 
Proof: When 𝜆𝜆 <
>
1
2
, we can show that (i) 𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 − 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 = √6𝐹𝐹(1−2𝜆𝜆)(1+2𝜆𝜆)3(2+4𝜆𝜆+3𝜆𝜆2) ><0, (ii) 𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵 − 𝑛𝑛𝐴𝐴 = 3(1+𝜆𝜆)(2𝜆𝜆−1)2+4𝜆𝜆+3𝜆𝜆2 <>0 
and (iii) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵 − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 = 𝐹𝐹(1−2𝜆𝜆)(1+2𝜆𝜆)(9𝐹𝐹(1+2𝜆𝜆)2−√6(3+𝜆𝜆(7+5𝜆𝜆)))9(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))2 <>0  in the range of 0 < 𝐹𝐹 < F∗. 
                                            
given number of firms in oligopoly. See, for example, Shaffer (1995), Lee (1999) and Requate (2007). 
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Finally, we have that 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 −𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 = 𝐹𝐹2(2𝜆𝜆−1)2(1+𝜆𝜆)2+4𝜆𝜆+3𝜆𝜆2 ≥ 0 and the equality holds only when 𝜆𝜆 = 12. 
The economic explanations behind these results are as follows. Under the fixed number of firms 
in imperfect competition markets without EBT, it is well-know that the ex-post optimal tax rate should 
be lower than the marginal damage because oligopolistic firms produce less outputs due to the market 
power distortion. On the other hand, under the free-entry equilibrium, the ex-ante optimal tax rate 
should be equal to the marginal damage because the tax effect on the outputs can be offset by the effect 
on the endogenously chosen number of firms. Thus, ex-post taxation yields a lower tax level than the 
ex-ante taxation when the shadow cost is small. It also induces that ex-post taxation yields a larger 
number of private firms and a higher environmental damage  
As the shadow cost increases, however, the effect of EBT is more significant and thus, the 
government induces public firm become more aggressive and thus produces more outputs. Since the 
output of private firm is determined by the zero-profit condition in a free-entry market equilibrium, total 
number of entering firms and tax rate determine the total market outputs. Further, a higher concern on 
the EBT induces a lower number of private firms under both ex-ante and ex-post taxation cases, but it 
works on the tax rates differently under ex-ante and ex-post taxation cases. Under ex-ante taxation the 
total outputs of private firms decreases as the shadow cost increases and thus, in order to remedy the 
distortion of less production, the efficient departure between the optimal tax and the marginal damage 
increases. On the contrary, under ex-post taxation the total outputs of private firms depend on the 
shadow cost. In particular, if the shadow cost is very high, the optimal tax should be higher than the 
marginal damage in order to reduce welfare loss from the other markets. Hence, ex-post taxation yields 
higher tax level than the ex-ante taxation when the shadow cost is large. It induces that ex-post taxation 
yields a smaller number of private firms and a lower environmental damage.  
Finally, regardless of the shadow cost, the effect of EBT can increase the welfare, and the ex-ante 
taxation always yields higher welfare than ex-post taxation. This is because the government is able to 
commit to set the tax rate at the optimal ex-post tax rate under ex-ante taxation before the firms enter 
the market, but the reverse cannot be achievable. These results are summarized in Table 1. 
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper investigates the environmental policies in free-entry mixed markets and examines the 
effect of excess burden of taxation and the impact of the timing of environmental taxation. We compare 
two models in free-entry mixed markets. We find that ex-post taxation yields a lower (higher) 
environmental tax level than the ex-ante taxation case when the excess burden of taxation is small 
(large). It induces that ex-post taxation yields a larger (smaller) number of private firms and a higher 
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(lower) environmental damage. We also find that the effect of excess burden of taxation can increase 
the welfare, but the ex-ante taxation always yields higher welfare than ex-post taxation. 
Regarding the effect of EBT, the number of private firms is always decreasing in the shadow cost, 
which is independent of the timing of implementation of environmental policy. However, the optimal 
tax is decreasing in the shadow cost if it is implemented before entry, while it is decreasing (increasing) 
when the excess burden of taxation is small (large) if it is implemented after entry. These results suggest 
that market liberalization policy and environmental policy can be either complements or substitutes 
depending on the timing of taxation and the size of excess burden of taxation. The endogenous choice 
on the relationship between these two policies remains for future research. 
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Table 1: The effects of EBT on the equilibrium results of the two models 
 Ex-ante taxation Ex-post taxation 
n 
(√6−12𝐹𝐹)(1+𝜆𝜆)2
2𝐹𝐹(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))  where 𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆 < 0. (1+𝜆𝜆)(√6(1+𝜆𝜆)−6𝐹𝐹(1+4𝜆𝜆))2𝐹𝐹(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))  where 𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛𝐴𝐴𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆 < 0. 
t 
3+𝜆𝜆(5+4𝜆𝜆)−2√6𝐹𝐹(1+𝜆𝜆+𝜆𝜆2)
6+3𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆)   
where 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
< 0. 3+𝜆𝜆(5+4𝜆𝜆)−√6𝐹𝐹(3+2(1−𝜆𝜆)𝜆𝜆)6+3𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆)   where 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
<
>
0 if 𝐹𝐹 <
>
2+(2−𝜆𝜆)𝜆𝜆
2√6(4+𝜆𝜆(13+7𝜆𝜆)). 
Q 
√6(3+𝜆𝜆(7+5𝜆𝜆))−12𝐹𝐹�1+3𝜆𝜆+2𝜆𝜆2�
3√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))   
where 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0. √6(3+𝜆𝜆(7+5𝜆𝜆))−6𝐹𝐹(1+6𝜆𝜆+8𝜆𝜆
2)
3√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))    
where 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
>
<
0 if 𝐹𝐹 <
>
2+(2−𝜆𝜆)𝜆𝜆
2√6(4+𝜆𝜆(13+7𝜆𝜆)). 
ED 
{√6�3+𝜆𝜆(7+5𝜆𝜆)�−12𝐹𝐹�1+3𝜆𝜆+2𝜆𝜆2�}2
108(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))2   
where 𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0. {√6�3+𝜆𝜆
(7+5𝜆𝜆)�−6𝐹𝐹�1+6𝜆𝜆+8𝜆𝜆2�}2
108(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))2    
where 𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
>
<
0 if 𝐹𝐹 <
>
2+(2−𝜆𝜆)𝜆𝜆
2√6(4+𝜆𝜆(13+7𝜆𝜆)). 
MD 
√6(3+𝜆𝜆(7+5𝜆𝜆))−12𝐹𝐹�1+3𝜆𝜆+2𝜆𝜆2�
3√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))    
where 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0. √6(3+𝜆𝜆(7+5𝜆𝜆))−6𝐹𝐹(1+6𝜆𝜆+8𝜆𝜆
2)
3√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))    
where 𝜕𝜕𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
>
<
0 if 𝐹𝐹 <
>
2+(2−𝜆𝜆)𝜆𝜆
2√6(4+𝜆𝜆(13+7𝜆𝜆)). 
W 
(1+𝜆𝜆){3−4√6𝐹𝐹(1+𝜆𝜆)2+24𝐹𝐹2(1+𝜆𝜆)2+2𝜆𝜆(3+2𝜆𝜆)}
6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))   
where 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0. (1+𝜆𝜆){√6�3+6𝜆𝜆+4𝜆𝜆
2�+18√6𝐹𝐹2(1+4𝜆𝜆)−24𝐹𝐹(1+𝜆𝜆)2}
6√6(2+𝜆𝜆(4+3𝜆𝜆))   
where 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
> 0. 
 𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵 when 𝜆𝜆 ≥ 0 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 < 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 when 0 ≤ 𝜆𝜆 ≤ 12  𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴 ><𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 when 𝜆𝜆 > 12 and 𝜆𝜆(2+𝜆𝜆)2√6(−1+2𝜆𝜆+5𝜆𝜆2) <>𝐹𝐹. 
 
